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Case Law for Functional Behavior Assessments and 
Behavior Intervention Plans: An Empirical Analysis 
Perry A. Zirkel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An interrelated pair of procedures that have come into favor in the 
field of special education for proactively addressing the behavior prob-
lems of students with disabilities—which range from violence to self or 
others to extreme introversion or inattention—are functional behavior 
assessments (FBAs) and behavior intervention plans (BIPs). An FBA is a 
systematic process of identifying the purpose—and more specifically the 
function—of problem behaviors by investigating the preexisting envi-
ronmental factors that have served the purpose of these behaviors.1 Based 
on the foundation provided by FBAs, a BIP is a concrete plan of action 
for reducing problem behaviors, dictated by the particular needs of the 
student exhibiting the behaviors.2 Special education experts regard an 
FBA as inseparable from an effective, relevant, and efficient BIP.3 
The principal legal framework for providing special education gen-
erally, and FBAs and BIPs specifically, for students with disabilities is 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).4 The IDEA re-
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 1. See generally Gregory P. Hanley et al., Functional Analysis of Problem Behavior: A Review, 
36 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 147 (2003); Mark W. Steege & T. Steuart Watson, Best Practices 
in Functional Behavior Assessment, in BEST PRACTICES IN SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY V 337 (Alex 
Thomas & Jeff Grimes eds., 2008). 
 2. See generally Rutherford Turnbull, III et al., Public Policy Foundations for Positive Beha-
vioral Interventions, Strategies, and Supports, 2 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 218 (2000). 
 3. E.g., George Sugai et al., Applying Positive Behavior Support and Functional Behavioral 
Assessments in Schools, 23 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 131 (2000); Turnbull et al., supra 
note 2, at 220; T. Steuart Watson et al., Teacher-Implemented Functional Analysis and Treatment: A 
Method for Linking Assessment to Intervention, 28 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 292, 293–94 (1999). 
 4. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1450 (2008). The IDEA 
regulations are at 34 C.F.R. pt., 300. The overlapping secondary statutory and regulatory framework 
at the federal level consists of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act. See generally PERRY A. ZIRKEL, SECTION 504, THE ADA AND THE SCHOOLS (3d ed. 2011). 
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quires school districts to provide each “child with disability”5 with “free 
appropriate public education” (FAPE)6 via an individualized education 
program (IEP)7 in the “least restrictive environment” (LRE).8 The Act 
includes detailed provisions for the content specifications for IEPs9 and 
for the procedural protections for disciplinary changes in placement.10 
Each state educational agency (SEA) receives and distributes funding 
available under the IDEA and is responsible for monitoring compliance 
with the Act’s various requirements.11 The IDEA’s primary dispute reso-
lution mechanism is adjudicative, starting at the administrative level with 
an impartial hearing officer and, in states that opt for a second adminis-
trative tier, a review officer.12 Federal and state courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction under the IDEA for judicial review of hearing officer deci-
sions and, if applicable, review officer decisions.13 
In its landmark decision under the IDEA, Board of Education v. 
Rowley,14 the Supreme Court interpreted the original version of the IDEA 
to provide for a two-pronged standard of FAPE. Viewing Congress as 
emphasizing access via procedures, the Court concluded that the purpose 
of the legislation was to “open the door”15 rather than to provide a high 
substantive floor. Thus, the Rowley Court concluded that the standards 
for FAPE were the following: (1) did the district comply with the various 
applicable procedures, and (2) is the IEP “reasonably calculated to ena-
                                                 
 5. 20 U.S.C. § 1402(3). 
 6. Id. §§ 1402(9), 1412(a)(1). 
 7. Id. §§ 1402(9) & (14), 1412(d). 
 8. Id. § 1412(a)(5). The LRE requires placement within the range of placement options that, 
with supplementary aids and services, provide interaction with nondisabled students to the maximum 
extent appropriate. Thus, although associated with the concept of mainstreaming or inclusion, 
LRE—via its reference to appropriateness and its interrelationship with FAPE—does not mean 
placement of every child with a disability in the regular classroom. 
 9. Id. § 1412(d)(1)(A). 
 10. Id. § 1415(k)(1). Disciplinary changes in placement under the Act are removals—typically 
referred to by schools as “suspensions” or “expulsions”—that exceed ten school days. Id. 
§ 1415(k)(1)(B). For the distinction between consecutive and cumulative days within a school year, 
see infra note 78. 
 11. E.g., id. § 1412(a). 
 12. Id. § 1415(f)–(g). For a current snapshot of the state one- and two-tier systems under the 
IDEA, see Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems under the IDEA: A State-by-
State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3 (2009). For trends in the frequency of hearings under 
the IDEA, see Perry A. Zirkel & Karen Gischlar, Due Process Hearings under the IDEA: A Longi-
tudinal Frequency Analysis, 21 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 22 (2008). For an overview of the 
alternate IDEA mechanism of the state complaint resolution system and the overlapping dispute 
resolution avenues under Section 504 and the ADA, see Perry A. Zirkel & Brooke L. McGuire, A 
Roadmap of Legal Dispute Resolution for Students with Disabilities, 23 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 
LEADERSHIP 100 (2010). 
 13. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i). 
 14. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 15. Id. at 192. 
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ble the child to receive educational benefits?”16 The substantive standard 
was relatively low; indeed, as the dissent pointed out,17 a district could 
apparently meet the standard by providing a teacher with a loud voice to 
Amy Rowley, whose disability was deafness. In the intervening years 
since Rowley, the Supreme Court has addressed various other IDEA is-
sues, but not FBAs or BIPs,18 and Congress has codified a modified pro-
cedural standard for FAPE.19 
The special education literature on FBAs and BIPs is full of rhetor-
ic, research, and increasingly more detailed practical sources, but the le-
gal literature specific to FBAs and BIPs is much more limited in both 
quantity and quality.  Both of these intersecting literature streams reflect 
a notable misunderstanding of the legal requirements for FBAs and BIPs 
(i.e., the minimum that must be done) and fail to differentiate profession-
al best practice (i.e., the optimum amount to do).20 Moreover, a compre-
hensive and systematic analysis of the case law is missing. 
This Article fills this gap by providing an empirical analysis of 
IDEA case law after reviewing the legal literature on FBAs and BIPs and 
synthesizing the legal framework of the IDEA. I propose that such a sys-
tematic synthesis offers two separable and parallel contributions to the 
field of special education. First, it shows practitioners and researchers in 
the field of special education the significant difference between the 
“should” of their professional norms and the “must” of the IDEA’s legal 
requirements. Second, it informs adjudicators and policymakers in spe-
cial education law of the need for more consistent and well-conceived 
legal standards for determining whether a student with disabilities is en-
titled to an FBA or a BIP and, if so, whether its contents and implemen-
tation are appropriate under the IDEA and its corollary state special edu-
cation laws. 
Part II of this Article provides a review of the literature concerning 
FBAs and BIPs, with particular attention to legal analyses. Part III pro-
vides an overview of IDEA legislation and, in particular, the 1997 and 
                                                 
 16. Id. at 206–07. 
 17. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting). 
 18. For an overview of most of these decisions, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, A Primer of Special 
Education Law, 38 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 62 (2005). 
 19. Section 1415(f)(3)(E) of the IDEA provides the following: 
In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing officer may find that a child did not 
receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies— 
(i) Impeded the child’s right to a FAPE; 
(ii) Significantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to participate in the decision-making 
process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the parent’s child; or 
(iii) Caused a deprivation of educational benefit. 
 20. E.g., Steege & Watson, supra note 1, at 344 (characterizing FBAs and BIPs as not only 
legally required but also the best practice without any differentiation). 
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2004 amendments that are specific to FBAs and BIPs. Part IV summariz-
es the method used for collecting and analyzing case law concerning 
these two interrelated behavioral techniques under the IDEA. Part V pro-
vides the results of this empirical analysis, and Part VI provides a discus-
sion of these results. Finally, Part VII concludes that there is a need for a 
more consistent and coherent approach to the access, appropriateness, 
and implementation of FBAs and BIPs under the IDEA. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Special Education Dimension 
The perceived need for the FBA–BIP approach arose from the inef-
fectiveness of the early behavioral intervention approach, which had fo-
cused on imposing arbitrary consequential events upon the occurrence of 
a problem behavior.21  Subjective opinion often shaped the diagnostic 
criteria used to determine the form of intervention—i.e., reinforcement or 
punishment.22 This approach had several inherent shortcomings: (1) in-
tervention often ignored an individual student’s needs by overly empha-
sizing the topography of problem behaviors rather than exploring their 
triggers; (2) intervention success was temporary, as problem behaviors 
reemerged due to the failure to address preexisting factors; and (3) inter-
vention ineffectiveness often led to the use of more restrictive, more in-
trusive, and more punitive interventions.23 
To overcome these limitations, researchers shifted the focus of their 
conceptual discussion to the environmental factors surrounding problem 
behavior.24 The resulting empirical research revealed that the environ-
mental factors serving the particular purpose and function of a problem 
behavior maintained a topographically identical behavior.25 For example, 
one student may exhibit aggression for the purpose of gaining a teacher’s 
attention whereas another student may exhibit the same form of aggres-
                                                 
 21. E.g., Teodoro Ayllon & Jack Michael, The Psychiatric Nurse as Behavioral Engineer, 2 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 323 (1959). 
 22. E.g., Steege & Watson, supra note 1, at 337–47. 
 23. E.g., Nathan H. Azrin, A Strategy for Applied Research, 32 AM. PSYCHOL. 140 (1977); 
Donald M. Baer, A Fight of Behavior Analysis, 4 BEHAV. ANALYST 85 (1981); Samuel M. Dietz, 
Current Status of Applied Behavior Analysis, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 805 (1978); Ruth A. Ervin et al., 
Reaffirming the Importance of Analysis in Applied Behavior Analysis: A Review of Functional Anal-
ysis of Problem Behavior, 34 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 255 (2001). 
 24. E.g., Donald M. Baer et al., Some Current Dimensions of Applied Behavior Analysis, 1 J. 
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 91 (1968). 
 25. See, e.g., Edward G. Carr et al., Escape as a Factor in the Aggressive Behavior of Two 
Retarded Children, 13 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 101 (1980); Marian Weeks & Robert Gaylord-
Ross, Task Difficulty and Aberrant Behavior in Severely Handicapped Students, 14 J. APPLIED 
BEHAV. ANALYSIS 449 (1981). 
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sion to avoid difficult class instruction. The use of a detention room may 
assuage the aggression for the first student and aggravate it for the 
second student. Thus, these early studies illustrated the value of, and 
prompted the need for, a procedure for identifying and assessing the 
preexisting environmental factors that serve the purpose and function of 
the problem behaviors.26 
In the first comprehensive analysis of a general model of FBA–BIP 
procedure, two separate teams of researchers developed and refined a 
concurrent assessment of the occurrence of problem behaviors under 
three to four test conditions containing different environmental factors, 
such as amount of attention and difficulty of instruction.27 They found 
that the occurrence of aggressive behaviors was higher under a particular 
test condition, suggesting that the particular condition served the purpose 
of the behaviors.28 Subsequent studies replicated and extended this FBA–
BIP procedure across a wide range of student populations, target beha-
viors, and educational environments, leading to the development of more 
precise positive-reinforcement-based interventions and demonstrating an 
apparent decrease in the use of overly restrictive, intrusive, and punitive 
interventions.29 Further research efforts are in progress to refine an FBA–
BIP procedure that is more applicable to the school setting.30 
Although research has not yet yielded one particular set of proce-
dures as a proven best practice, special education experts recommend 
FBAs as the foundational steps of a two-pronged strategy that should 
include the following core components and culminate in a BIP: (1) oper-
ational definitions of problem behaviors; (2) descriptions of the assess-
ment conditions that may reliably predict the occurrence and nonoccur-
rence of problem behaviors; (3) descriptions of the consequence events 
that maintain problem behaviors; (4) direct observation of the problem 
                                                 
 26. E.g., Hanley et al., supra note 1. 
 27. Edward G. Carr & V. Mark Durand, Reducing Behavior Problems Through Functional 
Communication Training, 18 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 111 (1985); Brian A. Iwata et al., To-
ward a Functional Analysis of Self-Injury, 2 ANALYSIS & INTERVENTION IN DEV. DISABILITIES 3 
(1982) (reprinted in 27 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 197 (1994)). 
 28. Carr & Durand, supra note 27, at 111; Iwata et al., supra note 27, at 3. 
 29. E.g., Craig H. Kennedy et al., Analyzing the Multiple Functions of Stereotypical Behavior 
for Students with Autism, 33 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 559 (2000); Lillian Pelios et al., The 
Impact of Functional Analysis Methodology on Treatment Choice for Self-Injurious and Aggressive 
Behavior, 32 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 185 (1999). 
 30. E.g., James Fox & Carol Davis, Functional Behavior Assessment in Schools: Current Re-
search Findings and Future Directions, 14 J. BEHAV. EDUC. 1 (2005); Steege & Watson, supra note 
1. 
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behaviors across the assessment conditions; and (5) a BIP based on the 
analysis of this information.31 
B. Legal Dimension 
The legal literature addressing FBAs and BIPs is limited and, to a 
notable extent, is neither sufficiently complete nor accurate. The first 
legal analysis of FBAs or BIPs was a state-by-state survey study limited 
to FBAs after their initial recognition in the 1997 amendments to the 
IDEA.32 The National Association of State Directors of Special Educa-
tion (NASDSE) provided a brief summary of the survey results from 
“[forty-five responding] states and territories about policies, procedures 
and guidelines related to . . . [FBAs].”33 Specifically, NASDSE reported 
that, in the wake of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA and prior to the 
1999 IDEA regulations, nineteen respondents had—and another thirty-
five respondents planned to revise or develop—written policies, proce-
dures, or guidelines for FBAs. But the report did not provide any syste-
matic information about the nineteen respondents in the first group, such 
as which were states versus territories, what was the nature of their poli-
cies or guidance, and whether any of the policies, procedures, and guid-
ance were legally binding (i.e., codified in state laws).34 
Similarly, triggered by the initial express recognition of FBAs in 
the IDEA, Professors Erik Drasgow and Mitchell Yell 35  followed an 
overview of the 1997 amendments with an analysis of “due process hear-
ings that directly involved FBAs from the time that IDEA 1997 became 
law until August 2000.”36 Noting an absence of any published court deci-
sions, they identified fourteen hearing officer decisions and reported that 
the outcomes were in favor of the parents in thirteen (94%) of these non-
judicial decisions. Reflecting a professional inclination toward best prac-
tice instead of legal objectivity, Professors Drasgow and Yell concluded 
that school districts conducting FBAs and developing BIPs in only the 
                                                 
 31. Fox & Davis, supra note 30; Steege & Watson, supra note 1; Sugai et al., supra note 3; 
Turnbull et al., supra note 2. 
 32. For the explicit recognition of FBAs and BIPs in the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, see 
infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 33 . PROJECT FORUM AT NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE DIRECTORS OF SPECIAL EDUC., QTA, 
FUNCTIONAL BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT STATE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 1 (June 1998), http:// 
www.nasdse.org/Portals/0/Documents/Download Publications/PFR-808.pdf. 
 34. For the distinction and the need for differentiation in the field of special education, see, 
e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Lisa B. Thomas, State Laws and Guidelines for Implementing RTI, 43 
TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 60 (Sept./Oct. 2010). 
 35. Erik Drasgow & Mitchell L. Yell, Functional Behavioral Assessments: Legal Requirements 
and Challenges, 30 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 239 (2001). 
 36. Id. at 246. “Due process hearings” in this context refers to the impartial hearings that are 
the first tier of adjudication under the IDEA. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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limited circumstances prescribed in the IDEA “will probably not meet 
IDEA ’97’s requirement to address problem behavior proactively.”37 
The Drasgow–Yell analysis had several significant limitations. 
First, it relied on an Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP)38 pol-
icy memorandum for its conclusion rather than on the legislation, regula-
tions, and hearing officer decisions, and the policy memorandum did not 
constitute a requirement.39 Second, the selection criteria for nonjudicial 
decisions, which were limited to those addressing FBAs, were not suffi-
ciently precise in terms of formulation and implementation. For example, 
four of their fourteen decisions did not have an FBA issue, being limited 
instead to a BIP.40 Similarly, at least as many of the selected decisions 
were based on state law requirements that exceeded those of the IDEA.41 
Additionally, although the article was premised on the 1997 IDEA 
amendments, approximately half of the decisions arose prior to July 1, 
1998, the date when the pertinent provisions became effective.42 Com-
pounding these deficiencies, the sample of case law was too limited in 
total number, adjudicative level, and time period to demonstrate weighty 
legal trends. Finally, the ultimate analysis of the hearing officer decisions 
was questionable. For example, the reported 94% parent-win rate did not 
take into consideration other differences revealed by more refined out-
                                                 
 37. Id. at 250. In a separate article that did not include case law, Drasgow and Yell made clear 
that they interpreted the 1997 amendments to the IDEA to require the development of FBAs and 
BIPs not only for disciplinary changes in placement but also for students whose behavior impedes 
their learning or the learning of others. Erik Drasgow et al., The IDEA Amendments of 1997: A 
School-Wide Model for Conducting Functional Behavioral Assessments and Developing Behavior 
Intervention Plans, 22 EDUC. & TREATMENT OF CHILD. 244, 261–63 (1999). 
 38. OSEP is the unit in the U.S. Department of Education specifically responsible for adminis-
tering the IDEA. See Welcome to OSEP!, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about 
/offices/list/osers/osep/index.html (last visited July 18, 2011). 
 39. For a discussion of the nonbinding, although often persuasive, weight of OSEP’s policy 
interpretations, see Perry A. Zirkel, Do OSEP Policy Letters Have Legal Weight?,171 EDUC. LAW 
REP. 391 (2003). 
 40. See, e.g., Mason City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR ¶ 216 (Iowa SEA 2000); Stroudsburg 
Area Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 975 (Pa. SEA 1998); Devine Indep. Sch. Dist., 25 IDELR 1238 (Tex. 
SEA 1997). 
 41. See, e.g., Moorpark Unified Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR ¶ 24 (Cal. SEA 1999); Indep. Sch. Dist. 
No. 2310, 29 IDELR 330 (Minn. SEA 1998); Jim Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 320 (Pa. SEA 
1998). 
 42. See, e.g., Bonita Unified Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 248 (Cal. SEA 1997); William S. Hart Sch. 
Dist., 26 IDELR 1258 (Cal. SEA 1997); Devine Indep. Sch. Dist., 25 IDELR 1238 (Tex. SEA 1997). 
Additionally, contrary to their assertion of the absence of judicial authority, at least one of the four-
teen cases was subject to a court decision during the time period for the case selection. See Strouds-
burg Area Sch. Dist. v. Jared M., 712 A.2d 807 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998). 
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come scales43 and the dramatically different outcome pattern for IDEA 
hearing and review officer decisions.44 
Next, in 2006, a pair of articles that focused on BIPs highlighted 
another limitation—confusing legal requirements regarding professional 
recommendations—that resulted in an inaccurate legal analysis. In the 
first of these two articles, Professor Susan Etscheidt provided detailed 
methodological information explaining her identification of fifty-two 
published decisions in LRP’s databases45 “in which the development of a 
BIP was at issue” ranging from one in 1997 to two in 2005.46 Her analy-
sis had three primary problems that lead to skewed results. First, she did 
not adequately account for differences in legal weight of the decisions. 
For example, in her tabulation, she relied on a hearing officer’s decision 
in Illinois47 that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.48 Indeed, 
in reversing the hearing officer’s decision, the Seventh Circuit expressly 
rejected Etscheidt’s approach of “manufactur[ing] the substantive criteria 
of a sufficient [BIP] based on a string of administrative opinions.”49 
Second, she did not take into account the difference between the IDEA 
and more stringent state laws.50 Finally, and more significantly, she used 
qualitative research techniques for content analysis thus failing to diffe-
rentiate between the holding and the dicta in the various decisions.51 The 
                                                 
 43. See, e.g., Youssef Chouhoud & Perry A. Zirkel, The Goss Progeny: An Empirical Analysis, 
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 353 (2008). 
 44. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Anastasia D’Angelo, Special Education Case Law: An Empiri-
cal Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. LAW REP. 731 (2002). 
 45. LRP is the major specialized publisher for legal materials in special education. Its materials 
include the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report, which is the hard-copy case compi-
lation, and Special Ed Connection®, which is its electronic database. See LRP PUBLICATIONS, 
http://www.lrp.com (last visited July 18, 2011). 
 46. Susan Etscheidt, Behavioral Intervention Plans: Pedagogical and Legal Analysis of Issues, 
31 BEHAV. DISORDERS 223 (2006). 
 47. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR ¶ 209 (Ill. SEA 2002). 
 48. Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 49. Id. In this context, the Seventh Circuit was referring to Professor Etscheidt’s role as an 
IDEA hearing officer in an FBA–BIP decision on which the plaintiff–parent had relied. 
 50. Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for FBAs and BIPs, BEHAV. DISORDERS (forthcoming 2011). 
 51. For example, Etscheidt cited a Pennsylvania review officer’s decision to support the propo-
sition that the purported appropriateness criterion for BIPs should be individualized, specifically 
quoting the review officer as ruling that “the IEP team ‘did nothing to tailor the student’s [BIP] to 
his individual needs.’” Etscheidt, supra note 46, at 230. But this quotation is from the publisher’s 
abstract. In fact, the review officer affirmed the hearing officer’s LRE ruling with incidental com-
mentary refusing to endorse a BIP that did not target alternative coping skills. Hempfield Sch. Dist., 
28 IDELR 509, 512 (Pa. SEA 1998). As another example, she cited a Maine hearing officer’s deci-
sion to support her appropriateness criterion that the BIP include positive behavior strategies. But the 
hearing officer based this limited part of her denial of FAPE ruling on the lack of any BIP, not on the 
absence of any positive behavior strategies. The comment about the use of abbreviated school days, 
other than the conclusion that it constituted a denial of FAPE, merely hypothesized that it could have 
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result was the subjective identification of best practice themes, such as 
the notion that “a BIP must be developed if behavior is interfering with 
learning.” 52  Consequently, Professor Etscheidt’s conclusions do not 
square with the asserted legal support.53 
In the other 2006 study, Professors John Maag and Antonis Kat-
siyannis appropriately started with best practice recommendations for 
BIPs that were duly differentiated from the significantly lower IDEA 
requirements.54 But their subsequent “case law” analysis of ninety-six 
“decisions” from 1997 to 2003 included numerous sources—twenty-
eight Office for Civil Rights (OCR)55 rulings and one OSEP policy let-
ter—that were not adjudicative rulings. Additionally, the OCR letters of 
findings and voluntary resolution agreements relied upon in the study do 
not fall under the IDEA.56 Although the authors’ conclusions were more 
balanced than those of Professor Etscheidt’s, they similarly did not in-
clude a comprehensive tabulation of the cases, including the legal bases 
(e.g., IDEA or state law) and outcomes. Instead, they provided a brief 
overview that compared selected case rulings to the related provisions of 
IDEA 2004, which was not in effect at the time of those case rulings. 
Finally, their resulting recommendations did not separate those that were 
based on professional norms from those based on legal requirements. 
Thus, their conclusions, including the assertion that legal precedent “has 
established specific parameters”57 for BIPs, are clearly questionable. 
More recently, in an analysis of the 1997 and 2004 IDEA amend-
ments and court decisions concerning the general topic of discipline, re-
tired principal Allan Osborne and Professor Charles Russo included a 
section on FBAs and BIPs.58 Limiting their IDEA analysis to legislation, 
they averred that “FBAs and BIPs are required whenever school officials 
                                                                                                             
served as a positive incentive if there had been a BIP. Augusta Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 229, 1001 
(Me. SEA 2001). 
 52. Etscheidt, supra note 46, at 225. 
 53. For the asserted legal support in the IDEA, see infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
For the ultimately contrasting case law interpretation, see infra notes 181–83 and accompanying 
text. 
 54. John W. Maag & Antonis Katsiyannis, Behavioral Intervention Plans: Legal and Practical 
Considerations for Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 31 BEHAV. DISORDERS 348 
(2006). 
 55. OCR is the unit of the U.S. Department of Education responsible for administering Section 
504 and the ADA as applied to students in K–12 schools. For a general overview of the OCR, see 
the OCR’s website, which is available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html (last 
visited July 18, 2011). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Allan G. Osborne & Charles J. Russo, Update on the Disciplinary Provisions of the 1997 
and 2004 IDEA Amendments, 244 EDUC. LAW REP. 915 (2009). 
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seek to impose suspension of more than 10 days.”59 Osborne and Russo’s 
conclusion was clearly correct for the 1999 IDEA regulations, but—as 
summarized in Part III of this Article60—they missed the 2006 regula-
tions’ elimination of this requirement upon the eleventh day of removal. 
Similarly, they asserted broadly that “FBAs and BIPs are required re-
gardless of whether students’ misconduct is a manifestation of their dis-
abilities.”61 Thus, Osborne and Russo neglected the differential treatment 
that, as explained below,62 Congress provided in the 2004 amendments.63 
Finally, in a companion piece to the present study, I evaluated thir-
ty-one state laws, including both statutes and regulations, that are specif-
ic to FBAs and BIPs in the special education context.64 Through a syste-
matic tabulation of these state law provisions, which exceed the rather 
narrow foundation requirements of the IDEA, I revealed that most of 
these additions were of notably limited scope and specificity in terms of 
extending the entitlement to FBAs and BIPs and establishing standards 
for their appropriateness and implementation. California was the leading 
exception, with New York a distant second, in terms of the scope and 
specificity of additional provisions, such as definitional criteria for FBAs 
and BIPs. Because I created the categories and criteria, which may differ 
from those of scholars and researchers in special education, the reliability 
and validity of the findings of this study are subject to critical review and 
replication. 
In sum, the literature to date lacks a sufficiently careful, compre-
hensive, and current analysis of the legal requirements specific to FBAs 
and BIPs under the IDEA and related state laws. For case law addressing 
the IDEA’s legal framework, the analyses to date also fail to differentiate 
the following issues specific to FBAs and BIPs: (1) access (i.e., whether 
the child is entitled to an FBA or a BIP); (2) appropriateness (i.e., wheth-
er the FBA or BIP meets applicable legal standards); and (3) implemen-
tation (i.e., whether the district sufficiently provided the FBA or BIP that 
it had formulated). 
                                                 
 59. Id. at 916. 
 60. See infra Part III.B. 
 61. Osborne & Russo, supra note 58, at 916. 
 62. See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 63. Notably, in a recent point-counterpoint feature, Osborne and Russo continued to maintain 
the correctness of their interpretation of these two issues. See Allan Osborne, Charles Russo & Perry 
A. Zirkel, You Be the Judge: Point/Counterpoint—FBAs and BIPs, 45 ELA NOTES 8 (July 2010). 
 64. Zirkel, supra note 50. 
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III. IDEA FRAMEWORK 
This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of case law regard-
ing FBAs and BIPs since the express recognition of the behavioral strat-
egies in the 1997 IDEA amendments, with particular attention paid to the 
trend and frequency of the issues and outcomes. Providing the frame-
work for the case law analysis, Part III gives an overview of IDEA provi-
sions and related administrative regulations and interpretations that spe-
cifically pertain to FBAs and BIPs. 
The federal framework for the case law concerning FBAs and BIPs 
consists of three ever-evolving levels of the IDEA: (1) the statute itself, 
which is subject to periodic amendments and reauthorizations because it 
is a funding law; (2) the regulations, which the administering agency is-
sues after each set of amendments; and (3) the agency’s policy interpre-
tations, which includes the commentary accompanying the regulations as 
well as OSEP’s policy letters and memoranda. Also, as the OSEP inter-
pretations expressly acknowledge, state laws may exceed this federal 
minimum.65 The evolution of the IDEA legislation with respect to FBAs 
and BIPs has had three stages. At first, the IDEA contained no express 
provisions specific to FBAs and BIPs. Starting in 1997, the IDEA in-
cluded specific provisions that were indirectly pertinent with regard to 
IEPs 66  and directly pertinent with regard to disciplinary changes in 
placement.67 Finally, starting in 2004, these particular provisions were 
refined to directly address FBAs and BIPs. 
A. Legislation 
The IDEA did not contain any local educational agency (LEA)68 re-
quirements pertaining to FBAs or BIPs until the 1997 and 2004 amend-
ments. First, without expressly mentioning either FBAs or BIPs, the 
1997 amendments included the requirement, as a special consideration 
for IEP teams, that “in the case of a child whose behavior impedes his or 
her learning or that of others, consider, when appropriate, strategies, in-
                                                 
 65. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 66. An IEP is the document that the IDEA prescribes in considerable detail as the mechanism 
to demonstrate that the district has provided FAPE in the LRE to the child with a disability. See 
supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 67. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 68. The IDEA uses this term generically to refer to school districts and other local governmen-
tal entities that provide education to students with disabilities. Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (2008). LEAs have the primary responsibility of implementing the 
various requirements of the IDEA, subject to SEA oversight. See supra note 11 and accompanying 
text. 
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cluding positive behavioral interventions, strategies, and supports . . . .”69 
The 2004 amendments slightly strengthened this special consideration 
requirement by removing the “when appropriate” language and inserting 
the more straightforward language requiring the IEP team to consider 
“the use of positive behavioral intervention and supports, and other strat-
egies” to address such behavior.70 The operant verb of these iterations 
was “to consider,” not “to develop or implement,” and—more important-
ly—the objects were interventions, supports, and strategies, not specifi-
cally FBAs or BIPs. 
Second, and more significantly, the 1997 amendments expressly re-
quired an FBA and a BIP in tandem with disciplinary changes in place-
ment.71 Specifically, upon a disciplinary change in placement, including 
a removal to an interim educational setting for three specified serious 
behavior violations, the 1997 amendments required the development or 
modification of an FBA and a BIP in tandem with a determination of 
whether the student’s violation of the school’s conduct code is a manife-
station of the student’s disability.72 The 2004 amendments subtly diffe-
rentiated this requirement depending on the results of the manifestation 
determination. For determinations that the conduct in question was a ma-
nifestation of the child’s disability, the requirement for an FBA and a 
BIP remained the same.73 But for determinations that the conduct was 
not a manifestation of the child’s disability and for removals to a forty-
five-day interim alternate educational setting,74 the language changed to 
require “as appropriate, a[n] [FBA], behavior intervention services and 
modifications that are designed to address the behavior violation so that 
it does not recur.”75 Thus, the 2004 amendments relaxed the relevant re-
                                                 
 69. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 
§ 614(d)(3)(B)(i), 111 Stat. 37 (1997). For a comprehensive comparative overview of the 1997 
amendments, see Perry A. Zirkel, Suspensions and Expulsions of Students with Disabilities: The 
Latest Requirements, 214 EDUC. L. REP. 445 (2007). 
 70. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i). 
 71. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 72. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997 § 615(k)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
The three specified situations for these forty-five-day interim placements were weapons violations, 
use or possession of illegal drugs, and—as determined by the impartial hearing officer—substantial 
likelihood of danger to self or others. Id. 
 73. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(k)(1)(F)(i)–(ii). 
 74. The 2004 amendments added a fourth specified situation for the forty-five-day interim 
placement—where the student inflicts serious bodily injury on another person. Id. 
§ 1415(k)(1)(G)(iii). 
 75. Id. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii). This differentiation is predicated on the qualifier “as appropriate,” 
which weakens the requirement because it allows for exceptions in the scope of its application. But 
to the extent that the tandem “so that it does not recur” standard is stronger in the applicable cir-
cumstances, the overall imposition “irrespective of whether the behavior is determined to be a ma-
nifestation of the child’s disability” removes the differentiation. Id. 
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quirement in two ways: (1) they limited the FBA component to unde-
fined appropriate circumstances, and (2) they used more generic options 
than exclusively prescribing the BIP component.76 Overall, the legisla-
tion expressly required an FBA or a BIP only in connection with discip-
linary changes in placement. 
B. Regulations 
As explained in a prior article,77 the 1999 regulations expanded on 
the 1997 legislative amendments by requiring an “assessment plan” for 
an FBA and a BIP for any child that did not already have them upon the 
eleventh cumulative day of removal.78 The 2006 regulations, however, 
dropped this requirement and otherwise largely mirrored the 2004 
amendments in relevant parts. For example, the regulation for the IEP 
special consideration of learning-impeding behavior follows the legisla-
tive provision word for word.79 Similarly, the relevant requirements for 
FBAs and BIPs upon disciplinary changes in placement80  are almost 
identical to the legislative provisions. Like the legislation, the regulations 
do not include a definition, much less criteria, for either an FBA or a 
BIP. Thus, the regulations extended the requirement for FBAs or BIPs 
only in relation to disciplinary removals, and that extension was limited 
to FBAs only under the 1999 regulations not the presently applicable 
2006 regulations. 
C. OSEP Interpretations 
In a policy memorandum issued directly after the 1997 amend-
ments,81 OSEP clarified that the then new legislation did not require an 
FBA for cumulative removals of less than ten days in a school year.82 In 
the same interpretive guidance, OSEP recommended—by using the word 
“should” rather than “shall”—proactive steps for learning-impeding be-
                                                 
 76. But the specified purpose of the more flexible behavioral component—designed to prevent 
recurrence—arguably provided a more stringent standard of appropriateness. 
 77. Zirkel, supra note 69, at 447–48. 
 78. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and the Early Interven-
tion Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,453 (Mar. 12, 1999). Un-
changed from the 1999 version, the 2006 regulations trigger a disciplinary change in placement at 
the eleventh consecutive school day of removal; for cumulative days, the regulations use a multi-
factor test for determining the point at which cumulative days amount, as a pattern, as the equivalent 
of eleven consecutive days. 34 C.F.R. § 300.536 (2009). 
 79. 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)(1). 
 80. Id. §§ 300.530(d)(1)(ii), (f)(1). 
 81. In a policy letter before the 1997 amendments, OSEP made it clear that the IDEA does not 
have a requirement for, or prohibition against, including BIPs in IEPs. Letter to Huefner, 23 IDELR 
1072 (OSEP 1995). 
 82. OSEP Mem. No. 97–7, 26 IDELR 981 (OSEP 1997). 
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havior. For example, OSEP stated that, in addition to the required con-
sideration, “school districts should take prompt steps to address miscon-
duct when it first appears,” providing that “when misconduct appears, 
a[n] [FBA] could be conducted.”83 The following year, in response to an 
inquiry that maintained that FBAs do not sufficiently honor a child’s 
strengths, OSEP recited related provisions in the 1997 amendments that 
emphasized positive behavior interventions and supports.84 
In the commentary accompanying the 1999 regulations, OSEP in-
cluded these interpretations: 
A[n] [FBA] may be an evaluation requiring parent consent if it 
meets the standard identified in [the regulation defining evalua-
tions]. In other cases, it may be a review of existing data that can 
be completed at the IEP meeting called to develop the assess-
ment plan [upon the eleventh cumulative day]. If under [the spe-
cial consideration regulation], IEP teams are proactively address-
ing a child’s behavior that impedes the child’s learning or that of 
others in the development of IEPs, those strategies, including 
positive behavioral interventions, strategies and supports in the 
child’s IEP will constitute the [BIP] that the IEP team reviews 
under [the requirements upon disciplinary changes in place-
ment].85 
The 1999 commentary also opined that “in appropriate circumstances, 
the IEP team . . . might determine that the child’s [BIP] includes specific 
regular or alternative disciplinary measures, such as denial of certain pri-
vileges or short suspensions, that would result from particular infractions 
of school rules, along with positive behavior intervention strategies and 
supports.”86 
In the commentary accompanying the 2006 regulations, OSEP pro-
vided its interpretation of regulatory provisions concerning IEPs and ma-
nifestation determinations. For the behavior-impeding situation, OSEP 
opined that FBAs and BIPs “are not required components of an IEP” un-
less state law provides otherwise. 87  More specifically, while viewing 
FBAs as typically preceding positive behavioral strategies presumably as 
a matter of best practice, OSEP rejected requiring an FBA for a child 
whose behavior impedes the learning of the child or others because the 
                                                 
 83. Id. at 982. 
 84. Letter to Anonymous, 30 IDELR 707 (OSEP 1998). 
 85. IDEA Regulations Commentary, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,621 (Mar. 12, 1999). 
 86. Id. at 12,479. 
 87. IDEA Regulations Commentary, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,629 (Aug. 14, 2006). 
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statutory language “focuses on interventions and strategies, not assess-
ments.”88 
For manifestation determinations, OSEP declined to specify stan-
dards for a valid or current FBA, reasoning that “such decisions are best 
left to the LEA, the parent, and [other] relevant members of the IEP 
Team.”89 Moreover, declining to add a requirement for an FBA and a 
BIP upon the determination that the misconduct was not a manifestation 
of the student’s disability,90 OSEP observed the change in legislative 
language and cross-referenced the IEP special consideration as “a proac-
tive approach . . . [that] should ensure that children who need [BIPs] to 
succeed in school receive them.”91 Thus, like its interpretations relating 
to the 1999 regulations, OSEP’s commentary encouraged preventive and 
proactive practices but was careful not to expand the requirements of the 
2006 regulations. 
After the issuance of the 2006 regulations, OSEP added further re-
levant interpretations in the form of policy letters and memoranda. These 
interpretations started with a policy letter tangentially related to the 
FBAs and BIPs, in which OSEP wrote that state special education regu-
lations that allow aversive interventions are not in conflict with the 
IDEA.92 In this policy letter, OSEP differentiated recommendations and 
requirements as follows: “While the [IDEA] requires that an IEP Team 
consider the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, and as 
such, emphasizes and encourages the use of such supports, it does not 
contain a flat prohibition on the use of aversive behavioral interven-
tions.”93 
Next, OSEP and its immediate parent agency, the Office of Special 
Education and Rehabilitation Services (OSERS),94 issued four successive 
clarifications that arguably reflect a revised emphasis on FBAs and BIPs. 
First, OSERS took the position that the regulations require both an FBA 
and a BIP only in cases of a disciplinary change in placement where the 
conduct is determined to be a manifestation of the child’s disability, whe-
reas the regulations permit an FBA or a BIP when the IEP Team deter-
                                                 
 88. Id. at 46,683. 
 89. Id. at 46,721. 
 90. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 91. IDEA Regulations Commentary, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,721. 
 92. Letter to Trader, 48 IDELR ¶ 47 (OSEP 2006). 
 93. Id. 
 94. In the organizational structure of the U.S. Department of Education, OSEP is a unit within 
OSERS. See About OSEP, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/abou 
tus.html (last visited July 18, 2011). 
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mines, under the special consideration provision or otherwise, that an 
FBA or BIP is appropriate for the child.95 
Second, and soon thereafter, OSEP said that an FBA is an evalua-
tion or reevaluation that has special requirements, including parental 
consent, but only if used to assist in determining a child’s eligibility for 
“free appropriate public education” (FAPE).96 As a result, OSEP con-
cluded that (1) an FBA in such circumstances, including an FBA to re-
vise the behavioral component in an IEP, requires parental consent; (2) 
an FBA conducted for individual evaluative purposes to develop or mod-
ify a BIP may trigger a parent’s right to an independent educational eval-
uation at public expense; and (3) an FBA conducted as best practice to 
assess the effectiveness of behavioral interventions in the school as a 
whole would not require parental consent.97 The following year, OSEP 
repeated the first consent interpretation of this earlier letter.98 
Third, OSERS recently issued a superseding interpretation that 
slightly strengthened its previous position by adding the following two 
limited situations where the legislation or regulations expressly require a 
BIP: (1) for a determination that the misconduct is not a manifestation of 
the child’s disability; and (2) “[f]or a child with a disability whose beha-
vior impedes his or her learning or that of others, and for whom the IEP 
Team has decided that a BIP is appropriate.”99 In light of the statutory 
qualifier “as appropriate,”100 the first situation is more of a reminder than 
an expander. Similarly, the second situation is largely limited to a seman-
tic circularity, as evidenced by comparing the previous memorandum101 
with this more recent conclusion: “FBAs and BIPs must also be used 
proactively, if the IEP Team determines that they would be appropriate 
for the child.”102 But this more recent policy statement added definitional 
guidance about an FBA: 
An FBA focuses on identifying the function or purpose behind a 
child’s behavior. Typically the process involves looking closely at a 
wide range of child-specific factors (e.g., social, affective, environ-
mental). Knowing why a child misbehaves is directly helpful to the 
IEP Team in developing a BIP that will reduce or eliminate the 
misbehavior.103 
                                                 
 95. Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures, 47 IDELR ¶ 227 (OSERS 2007). 
 96. Letter to Christiansen, 48 IDELR ¶ 161 (OSEP 2007). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Letter to Sarzynski, 51 IDELR ¶ 193 (OSEP 2008). 
 99. Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures, 52 IDELR ¶ 231 (OSERS 2009). 
 100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 101. Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures, 47 IDELR ¶ 227 (OSERS 2007). 
 102. Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures, 52 IDELR ¶ 231. 
 103. Id. 
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Moreover, this latest OSERS discipline guidance, which is in a 
question-and-answer format, slightly and perhaps insignificantly revised 
the intervening OSEP interpretation regarding whether an FBA consti-
tutes an evaluation or a reevaluation.104 By posing the question with re-
gard to an individual child, OSERS’s interpretation requiring consent 
would seem to be consistent with the 2007 OSEP letter.105 Similarly, the 
additional clarification regarding independent educational evaluations 
(IEE) would seem to square with the previous interpretation regarding 
those at public expense: “[A] parent who disagrees with an FBA that is 
conducted in order to develop an appropriate IEP also is entitled to re-
quest an IEE.”106 
Fourth, between the two latest OSERS interpretations, OSEP pro-
vided guidance as to what the purposes and components of an FBA are 
and who must conduct an FBA. More specifically, OSEP explained that 
the IDEA does not specify the components of an FBA beyond its linkage 
to the development of a BIP. Similarly, in the absence of IDEA specifi-
cations, OSEP deferred to state law as to who is qualified to conduct the 
FBA, rejecting the contention that the IDEA requires FBAs to be con-
ducted by a board-certified behavior analyst.107 
Thus, the various OSERS and OSEP interpretations, which adjudi-
cators often find persuasive but not binding,108 are not expansive with 
regard to access, appropriateness, and implementation of FBAs and BIPs. 
When carefully sifted from recommendations, the requirements specified 
in these agency interpretations do not differ significantly from the ex-
press language of the IDEA legislation and regulations. 
IV. METHOD 
To trace the longitudinal trend and categorical distribution of the 
frequency and outcomes of case law regarding FBAs and BIPs, this study 
provides an analysis of the issue rulings within the cases specific to 
FBAs and BIPs.109 For each ruling, the analysis of frequency (i.e., the 
number of final adjudications) and outcomes (i.e., the distribution be-
tween rulings in favor of the parent and those in favor of the district) was 
in terms of the successive issues for FBAs and BIPs, respectively.  Issues 
analyzed included the following: (1) whether the child was entitled to an 
                                                 
 104. Id. 
 105. Letter to Christiansen, 48 IDELR ¶ 161 (OSEP 2007). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Letter to Janssen, 51 IDELR ¶ 253 (OSEP 2008). 
 108. See Zirkel, supra note 39. 
 109. For the distinction between cases and issue rulings as the unit of analysis, see, e.g., Chou-
houd & Zirkel, supra note 43, at 367. 
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FBA or a BIP (designated as “access”);110 (2) whether the FBA or BIP 
met the requisite standards for quality (designated as “appropriateness”); 
and (3) whether the district actually and sufficiently provided the BIP111 
(designated as “implementation”).112 
The comprehensive sample113 consisted of both hearing/review of-
ficer decisions114 and court decisions published in the Individual with 
Disabilities Education Law Report (IDELR) 115  specific to FBAs and 
BIPs issued between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2010.116 The 
primary search mechanism was the IDELR topical index,117 although the 
following sources served to identify additional pertinent cases: (1) the 
topical index and the Boolean search mechanism of Special Ed Connec-
                                                 
 110. This tentative term is operationally understandable but legally imprecise. More specifical-
ly, it combines the collective concept of legal rights, the limited per se requirements of the IDEA and 
related state law, and the ad hoc concept of whether the individual child, under the particular cir-
cumstances of the case, was legally entitled to an FBA or a BIP. 
 111. Given the continuum of FBAs and BIPs, there were no cases regarding implementation of 
an FBA. Beyond development—after access and appropriateness—of an FBA, the next stage is a 
BIP. Thus, the FBA category had only two subcategories whereas the BIP had three. 
 112. These self-conceived labels appear herein simply as convenient short identifying phrases; 
they are not accepted terms of art or science with regard to FBAs or BIPs. In accordance with the 
field, however, they form a flowchart-like continuum that starts with access to an FBA and ends with 
implementation of a BIP. 
 113. Although far more comprehensive than the previous legal studies specific to FBAs and 
BIPs, “sample” here serves as a reminder that the target population is either all of the cases, includ-
ing those not “published” in the broad sense of any national database, or all cases in the LRP data-
base, which in recent years includes an increasing proportion of cases available only electronically. 
 114. The IDEA provides states with the option of having administrative adjudication via a one-
tier (i.e., hearing officer) or two-tier (i.e., hearing officer followed by review officer) system. 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2009). The citations of hearing and review officer decisions customarily contain 
the designation of “SEA” because the state education agency has the responsibility under the IDEA 
to establish and supervise this system. Most states have a one-tier system. See, e.g., Zirkel & Scala, 
supra note 12, at 5. For this reason, and because the IDELR does not generally distinguish between 
hearing and review officer decisions, this study—like others—refers generically to “hearing/review 
officer” decisions. 
 115. Published by LRP, IDELR is the only national hard-copy publication that includes not 
only court decisions but also hearing and review officer decisions, and has done so regularly since 
the late 1970s. 
 116. “Issued” in this context refers to the date of decision not the date of publication. Although 
only an approximate dividing line, 1998 was the starting point because it was in the immediate wake 
of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, which went into effect on October 1, 1997. 
 117. The principal topic headings were “Behavior Management/Modification” (specifically, 
the subtopics “Aversives,” “Development of Plan,” “Functional Behavioral Assessments,” and “In 
General”) and “Discipline” (specifically, the subtopics “Expulsion,” “Interim Alternate Educational 
Placements,” “Relationship between Misconduct and Disability,” and “Suspensions”), but the sub-
topic headings of “Behavior Managements” and “Discipline” served as supplementary sources 
where they appeared under other topic headings (e.g., under “Attention Deficit Disorders” and “Aut-
ism”). 
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tion®;118(2) the cases cited in previous studies;119 and (3) the Westlaw 
database.120 
The primary selection criteria were that (1) the case had at least one 
ruling on the merits specific to an FBA or a BIP, and (2) the decision was 
the final adjudication for the precise FBA or BIP issue raised.121 As a 
result of the first criterion,122 the survey excluded cases that (1) merely 
mentioned an FBA or a BIP in the background;123 (2) identified an FBA 
or a BIP issue but disposed of it on threshold technical grounds, such as 
subject-matter jurisdiction;124 (3) included an FBA or a BIP only in the 
remedy but not in the rulings or legal conclusions;125 (4) reported an FBA 
or a BIP ruling at a lower, unpublished level that was not at issue in the 
reported review decision;126 (5) ruled on a tangential FBA- or BIP-related 
issue;127 (6) ruled on behavioral strategies not specific to an FBA or a 
                                                 
 118. This electronic subscription service of LRP Publications also includes a topical index that 
captures hearing/review officer and court decisions published in IDELR in addition to others availa-
ble only electronically, which is similar to Westlaw’s coverage of court decisions more generally. 
 119. See Drasgow & Yell, supra note 35; Etscheidt, supra note 46; Maag & Katsiyannis, supra 
note 54; Osborne & Russo, supra note 58. 
 120. For the Boolean searches, the search terms included “functional behavior assessment,” 
“functional behavioral assessment,” “behavior intervention plan,” “behavior management plan,” and 
“behavior support plan.” 
 121. Given the framework of this study, its scope did not extend to the occasional claim 
beyond the IDEA or related state special education law. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Puerto Rico, 53 IDELR 
¶ 325 (D.P.R. 2010) (ruling under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s definition of “liberty”); 
Alex G. v. Bd. of Tr. of Davis Unified Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR ¶ 130 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (ruling under 
§ 504); Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR ¶ 256 (Pa. SEA 2004) (ruling under state gifted educa-
tion regulations). 
 122. An occasional case met or missed the first criterion only marginally. Compare, e.g., CJN 
v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 323 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2003) (ruling that incomplete compliance with the 
state’s BIP regulation was a minor procedural violation), with Evans v. Dist. No. 17 of Douglas 
Cnty., 841 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1988) (skirting the issue of a lack of a BIP by resolving tuition reim-
bursement on lack of parental notice). 
 123. See, e.g., J.L. v. Francis Howell R-3 Sch. Dist., 693 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 54 IDELR ¶ 5 
(E.D. Mo. 2010); Vigo Cnty. Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR ¶ 199 (Ind. SEA 2002). 
 124. See, e.g., C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2009); P.R. v. Cent. 
Tex. Autism Ctr., Inc., 52 IDELR ¶ 222 (W.D. Tex. 2009); cf. M.S.-G. v. Lenape Reg’l High Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 51 IDELR ¶ 236 (3d Cir. 2009) (insufficiency of due process hearing complaint); 
Cabouli v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 202 F. App’x 519 (2d Cir. 2006) (pretransition from private 
school); T.M. v. Allegany-Limestone Cent. Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 148 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (moot-
ness). 
 125. See, e.g., Johnson v. Olathe Dist. Sch., 316 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Kan. 2003); Watson Cha-
pel Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 899 (Ark. SEA 1998); E. Cent. Kan. Special Educ. Coop., 31 IDELR ¶ 256 
(Kan. SEA 1999); Alcorn Cnty. Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 136 (Miss. SEA 2009). 
 126. See, e.g., T.B. v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 628 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2010); M.P. v. Nobles-
ville Sch., 41 IDELR ¶ 33 (S.D. Ind. 2004); In re Student with a Disability, 42 IDELR ¶ 224 (Pa. 
SEA 2005). 
 127. See, e.g., Harris v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2008) (ruling on 
whether an FBA is an evaluation); Belmont Pub. Sch., 49 IDELR ¶ 209 (Mass. SEA) (deciding 
whether district may implement BIP without the IEP team considering its appropriateness); Bd. of 
Educ. of New York City, 48 IDELR ¶ 294 (N.Y. SEA 2007) (ruling on parent’s request to maintain 
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BIP;128 (7) ruled on an FBA or a BIP where a school district was not a 
party;129 (8) ruled on a closely related issue but not on the FBA or BIP 
itself;130 (9) ruled on an FBA or a BIP after the period of this study;131 
and (10) ruled on an FBA or a BIP but in a forum different from an 
IDEA hearing or review.132 The second criterion, which required search-
ing the history of each case and selecting the final FBA or BIP ruling,133 
resulted in the exclusion of two categories of cases: (1) the decisions in 
IDELR that were superseded by subsequent, typically higher-level deci-
sions in IDELR;134 and (2) the subsequent, typically higher-level deci-
sions that did not address the previous FBA or BIP ruling.135 
                                                                                                             
aversive BIP under the “stay-put” provision); Stancourt v. Worthington City Sch. Dist., 51 IDELR 
¶ 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 74 (2009) (determining whether reduction in 
reinforcement in BIP was violation of IDEA’s stay-put provision). 
 128. See, e.g., Damian J. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 49 IDELR ¶ 161 (E.D. Pa. 2008); San 
Rafael Elementary Sch. Dist. v. California Special Educ. Hearing Office, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1152 
(N.D. Cal. 2007); Elizabethtown Area Sch. Dist., 50 IDELR ¶ 24 (Pa. SEA 2008); Montgomery 
Cnty. Pub. Sch., 49 IDELR ¶ 174 (Md. SEA 2007); Surry Sch. Dep’t, 52 IDELR ¶ 209 (Me. SEA 
2009); Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 53 IDELR ¶ 248 (Tenn. SEA 2009). 
 129. See, e.g., A.G. v. Frieden, 52 IDELR ¶ 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ruling for Department of 
Mental Health under Part C of the IDEA). 
 130. See, e.g., Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 319 F. Supp. 2d 446 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004) (ruling that in the absence of an FBA, the manifestation determination warranted strict scruti-
ny); Pell City Bd. of Educ., 38 IDELR ¶ 253 (Ala. SEA 2003); Waterbury Bd. of Educ., 37 IDELR 
¶ 262 (Conn. SEA 2002) (ruling on whether a student who had a BIP needed an aide); cf. Masar v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Fruitport Cmty. Sch., 39 IDELR ¶ 239 (W.D. Mich. 2003) (ruling that expert testi-
mony concerning FBA was not at all decisive). 
 131. See, e.g., L.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 55 IDELR ¶ 280 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 132. See, e.g., St. Vrain Valley Dist. RE-1J, 38 IDELR ¶ 258 (Colo. SEA 2003) (ruling under 
state’s complaint resolution process under the IDEA); Shakopee Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 720, 45 
IDELR ¶ 171 (Minn. SEA 2005); In re Student with a Disability, 55 IDELR ¶ 299 (Wyo. SEA 
2010); cf. J.D.P. v. Cherokee Cnty. Sch. Dist., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (ruling on BIP 
claim based on § 504). Similarly, the scope of the study did not extend to the complaint process of 
the Office for Civil Rights, which is under § 504, not the IDEA. For an overview of these alternate 
avenues and forums, see Zirkel & McGuire, supra note 12. 
 133. On occasion, the IDELR had duplicate entries for the same case. Compare Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 279, 30 IDELR 645 (Minn. SEA 1998); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 60 (Tex. 
SEA 1998), with Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 33 IDELR ¶ 28 (Minn. SEA 1998); Houston Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 31 IDELR ¶ 46 (Tex. SEA 1998). 
 134. Some of these cases were at the hearing/review officer level. See, e.g., Waukee Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 26 (Iowa SEA 2007); Forrestville Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR ¶ 209 (Ill. SEA 
2002); Wilton-Lindeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR ¶ 236 (N.H. SEA 2005); Lake Travis 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 45 IDELR ¶ 204 (Tex. SEA 2005). Others were at the trial court level. See, e.g., 
Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray, 53 IDELR ¶ 77 (W.D. Mo. 2009); A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chappa-
qua Cent. Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); S.J. v. Issaquah Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 218 
(W.D. Wash. 2007); Lessard v. Wilton-Lindeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 299 (D.N.H. 
2007); Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11 v. Renollett, 42 IDELR ¶ 83 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 135. See, e.g., Lessard v. Wilton-Lindeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 267 (1st Cir. 2010); 
E.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist., 361 F. App’x 156 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. de-
nied, 130 S. Ct. 2064 (2010); Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267 
(7th Cir. 2007); Bynum v. W. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Sys., 55 IDELR ¶ 68 (M.D. La. 2010); N.S. 
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For each case that met the selection criteria, the coding was limited 
to the relevant ruling or rulings (i.e., those specific to the FBA or BIP). 
Thus, other rulings in the case were not part of the analysis. 
The first step of the analysis was separating the FBA issues from 
the BIP issues, and then further separating each category of cases into the 
aforementioned subcategories of access, appropriateness, and implemen-
tation.136 The next step was coding the rulings for each of these identified 
issues in terms of an established outcomes scale.137 Initially, based on 
previous studies that differentiated outcomes beyond complete wins or 
losses,138 the coding of outcomes was according to the following scale 
for issue rulings, 139  with the designation “parent” as proxy for the 
child:140 1 = conclusively in favor of the parent;141 2 = inconclusively in 
favor of the parent;142 3 = even split between the parent and the dis-
trict;143 4 = inconclusively in favor of the school district;144 and 5 = con-
                                                                                                             
v. Hawaii, 54 IDELR ¶ 250 (D. Haw. 2010); D.L. v. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1178 
(S.D. Iowa 2008). 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 111–12. Again, the exception was that FBA did not 
have an implementation subcategory. Id. 
 137. The overlap between FBA and BIP categories or subcategories was notable in approx-
imately one-fifth of the cases. As a result, the coding tended to merge not clearly differentiated rul-
ings into the ultimate one, such as BIP for an undifferentiated FBA–BIP overlap, or appropriateness 
for an undifferentiated access–appropriateness overlap. Thus, the coding was relatively conservative 
and, in some cases, only tentative. 
 138. The differentiation depended on the unit of analysis as well as the purpose of the study. 
See, e.g., Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 43, at 368 (using a five-category outcome scale for issue 
rulings); William H. Lupini & Perry A. Zirkel, An Outcomes Analysis of Education Litigation, 17 
EDUC. POL’Y, 257, 263–64 (2003) (using a seven-category scale for cases); James R. Newcomer & 
Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis of Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 EXCEPTIONAL 
CHILD. 469, 472 (1999) (using a five-category outcome scale for judicial review); Perry A. Zirkel & 
Caitlyn Lyons, Restraining the Use of Restraints with Student with Disabilities?: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Case Law, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 323 (2011) (using a five-category scale for claim 
rulings). 
 139. Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 43, found that for specific issue rulings, rather than over-
all cases, the outcome categories of predominantly, as contrasted with completely, for one party or 
the other were not necessary. 
 140. The cases did not include any of the limited situations where parents were exercising their 
independent rights under the IDEA. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Problematic Progeny of Winkel-
man v. Parma City School District, 248 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2009). 
 141. Examples are rulings on the merits in the parent’s favor not only after a hearing, trial, or 
appeal but also—and more typically in judicial review under the IDEA than in hearing/review offic-
er decisions—via granting a parent’s motion for summary judgment. 
 142. Exclusively limited to the judicial stage in this study, examples are rulings denying a 
district’s dispositive motion or, on appeal, upholding such a denial. 
 143. This category is limited to the relatively rare rulings denying both parties’ motions for 
summary judgment or awarding the parent approximately half of the relief sought. 
 144. Paralleling its obverse outcomes category of a “2,” examples herein were limited to court 
rulings denying a parent’s motion for summary judgment or, on appeal, upholding such a denial. 
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clusively in favor of the school district.145 Although the data analysis for 
frequency and outcomes followed the model of previous research where 
the appropriate unit of analysis was one or more rulings within a case,146 
the near absence of rulings in the aforementioned intermediate categories 
(i.e., 2, 3, and 4) allowed for outcomes analysis within the simpler dicho-
tomous scale of rulings in favor of the parent or the district (i.e., 1 or 5, 
respectively).147 
V. RESULTS 
The total number of relevant cases for the thirteen-year period of 
the study148 was 173, with 125 by hearing/review officers and 48 by 
courts.149 In turn, the 173 cases yielded 206 issue rulings, with 150 by 
hearing/review officers and 56 by courts.150 Of the 206 issue rulings, 57, 
or 24%, were for FBAs, and the remaining 149, or 72%, were for BIPs. 
Figure 1 displays the frequency of cases and issue rulings per three-
year intervals for the thirteen-year period, with the most recent interval 
being a straight-line projection made by tripling the initial year. The note 
at the bottom clarifies that the percentage in each white bar represents the 
proportion of these rulings issued by courts rather than by hearing/review 
officers. 
                                                 
 145. Similarly corresponding to outcomes category “1,” examples are rulings on the merits in 
the district’s favor either after a hearing, trial, or appeal, or via granting of a district’s motion for 
dismissal or summary judgment. 
 146. Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 43; cf. Zirkel & Lyons, supra note 138 (using the claim 
ruling as the primary unit of analysis but also providing a culminating outcomes analysis of cases 
because the tabulation included all of the rulings in the case). 
 147. The exclusion of closely related but separable rulings eliminated two potential exceptions 
in terms of inconclusive rulings. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. For the only remaining 
exception, Decatur Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 45 IDELR ¶ 294 (Ind. SEA 2006), the original coding of 
“3” for BIP implementation was resolved by separation into two rulings—a “1” for the first year and 
a “2” for the second year. 
 148. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
 149. A spreadsheet listing all of the cases and rulings is available from the author upon request. 
 150. The resulting ratio of relevant rulings per case was 1.19 for the total sample, 1.20 for the 
hearing/review officer cases, and 1.17 for the court cases. 
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“Ct.” = Court rulings (as a percentage, with the remainder being hearing/review officer rulings). 
 
An examination of Figure 1 reveals that the overall levels across the 
entire period amounted to an uneven, modestly upward trajectory.  
Moreover, the ratio between cases and issue rulings for each of the suc-
cessive intervals oscillated within a limited range.151 Finally, the propor-
tion of rulings from courts, compared with those from hearing/review 
officers, increased dramatically from the initial to the most recent inter-
vals, with the understanding that the last interval was limited to only one 
year. 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the combined hearing/review 
officer and court issue rulings for each of the successive three-year pe-
riods in terms of the two ultimate outcome categories: whether the ruling 
was in favor of the parent or the district. The notes at the bottom desig-
nate the aforementioned152 adjustment and the limited interval for the 
final year. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 151. Specifically, the respective ratios for the successive intervals were as follows: 1.08 for the 
years 1998–2000; 1.23 for the years 2001–2003; 1.26 for the years 2004–2006; 1.21 for the years 
2007–2009; and 1.06 for the years 2010–2011. 
 152. See supra note 147. 
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* One ruling, which was an even split for two successive annual IEPs together, was separated 
into two rulings—one in favor of the parent for the first year and the other in favor of the district for 
the second year. 
** Only a one-year period. 
 
Overall, Figure 2 shows that outcomes have gradually shifted from 
a majority clearly favoring the plaintiff–parents to a majority clearly fa-
voring the defendant–school districts, with the dividing point approx-
imately marked by the 2004 amendments to the IDEA. The proportion of 
outcomes in the district’s favor was dramatically pronounced for the 
most recent interval, but this interval was limited to only one year. 
Figure 3 presents the frequency distribution of the issue rulings in 
terms of the FBA and BIP categories and, within them, the further subca-
tegories of access, appropriateness, and implementation.153 
                                                 
 153. As previously explained, there were no FBA implementation rulings. See supra note 111. 
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Figure 3 illustrates that the BIP category accounted for far more 
rulings than the FBA category 154  and that the primary focuses were 
access for FBAs and appropriateness for BIPs. 
Figure 4 displays the outcomes in favor of each side for each issue 
subcategory—access, appropriateness, and, for BIPs, implementation. 
 
                                                 
 154. More specifically, the BIP category accounted for 149, or 73%, of the 206 rulings. 
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Overall, Figure 4 shows that the ratio of issue rulings hovered at or 
near an even split between the two sides (with slight balances in favor of 
parents in two subcategories), except for implementation of a BIP, which 
heavily favored school districts. But the differentiation was tentative in 
light of the small number of BIP implementation rulings155 and the nota-
ble overlap among the subcategories.156 
Next, Table 1 presents the outcome results for FBAs and BIPs in 
terms of the respective hearing/review officer and judicial forums. The 
final column reports the chi-square (2) analysis, which shows whether 
the difference in the outcomes distribution between the two forums was 
statistically significant (i.e., generalizable at a high level of probabili-
ty).157 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Outcomes Per Forum and Category 
 
 Hearing/Review Officer Court 2 For Parent For District For Parent For District 
FBA 25 (63%) 15 (38%) 4 (24%) 13 (76%) 2=5.77a* 
BIP 60 (55%) 50 (45%) 10 (26%) 29 (74%) 2=9.66** 
Total 85 (57%) 65 (43%) 14 (25%) 42 (75%) 2=16.38** 
a With Yates’s correction, which is a conservative adjustment to chi-square when applied to 
2-by-2 distributions with one or more cells with frequencies less than five. 
* p (i.e., probability) < .05 
** p < .01 
 
This table shows that the hearing/review officers’ FBA and BIP is-
sue rulings favored parents, while the courts’ FBA and BIP rulings fa-
vored districts. The differences between the two forums were statistically 
significant at the .05 and .01 probability levels, respectively. This infe-
rential analysis suggests a high likelihood that the results for this sample 
                                                 
 155. As Figure 3 reveals, BIP implementation accounted for nineteen issue rulings, which 
amounted to 13% of the BIP subtotal and 9% of the total issue rulings. 
 156. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 157. Chi-square is a statistical procedure to determine whether the frequency counts in two or 
more categories in a sample (here, published FBA and BIP rulings) are differently distributed to a 
significant extent, i.e., that the frequency counts are not due to chance but are instead generally 
applicable with a high degree of probability to a population (here, all FBA and BIP rulings, includ-
ing those that are not available in the Westlaw and LRP databases). See, e.g., MEREDITH D. GALL ET 
AL., EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 325–27 (2007). The customary degrees of probability (designated as 
“p”) are .05 and .01, equating to 95% and 99%, respectively. L.R. GAY ET AL., EDUCATIONAL 
RESEARCH 329 (2009). 
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are generalizable to the target population of hearing/review officer and 
court decisions.158 
Table 2 shows the respective outcomes of the issue rulings concern-
ing FBAs and BIPs, along with chi-square analysis,159 for the combina-
tion of the two forums. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Outcomes Per Category 
 
 For Parent For District 2 
FBA 29 (51%) 28 (49%) 2=0.25 ns 
BIP 70 (47%) 79 (53%) 
Total 99 (48%) 107 (52%)  
ns = not statistically significant 
 
This table shows that the difference between the outcomes of the 
FBA and BIP issues rulings was not statistically significant.160 Thus, the 
difference was most likely due to chance alone (i.e., as a result of sam-
pling or measurement error). Additionally, Table 2 illustrates that when 
all of the issue rulings are analyzed together, the districts fared slightly 
better (52%) than the parents (48%). 
Finally, the coding of the cases included notes on the role and basis 
of the FBA and BIP issue rulings in relation to the IDEA framework.161 
These notes were largely qualitative observations based on the hear-
ing/review officer’s or judge’s disposition of the FBA and BIP issues. A 
synthesis of these observations follows, first on an overall basis and then 
in terms of each of the issue subcategories. 
First, in most cases, the FBA–BIP analysis was only a small part of 
the overall case, either as one of several issues or as a component of a 
larger primary issue. Different from the IDEA framework, wherein an 
FBA and a BIP are express requirements only for disciplinary changes in 
placement,162 the majority of the cases concerned the statutory staples of 
FAPE or, less frequently, LRE.163 
                                                 
 158. See supra note 113. The intervening factor is the extent to which the sample is sufficiently 
representative of the target population. This issue has been subject to only limited and inconclusive 
research. See, e.g., Anastasia D’Angelo, J. Gary Lutz & Perry A. Zirkel, Are Published IDEA Hear-
ing Officer Decisions Representative?, 14 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 241 (2004). 
 159. See supra note 157. 
 160. “Not statistically significant” means that the chi value did not approach the requisite min-
imum level of p < .05. See also supra note 157. 
 161. See discussion supra Part III; supra notes 65–108 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. For a discussion of these interrelated corner-
stones of the IDEA, see, e.g., the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Board of Education of Hen-
drick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). In Rowley, the Court elabo-
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For what is here broadly referred to as “access,” hearing/review of-
ficers and courts tended to use some variation of the behavior-impeding 
standard.164  But in the hearing/review officer cases, especially in the 
many states that lack a legal standard distinctly different than that of the 
IDEA,165 the basis for the ruling tended to be rather ad hoc and often 
cryptic, explicitly or implicitly based on the evidence in the case, whe-
reas the courts tended to cite and apply the standard under the IDEA, or 
if there was one, the standard under state law. Moreover, the courts 
tended to be much stricter than hearing/review officers, interpreting 
“consider”166 and, when raised, “positive”167 as not being per se require-
ments of access to an FBA or a BIP.168 Finally, led by the Second Cir-
cuit’s recent decision in A.C. v. Board of Education of Chappaqua Cen-
tral School District,169 the federal district courts in New York have used 
the IDEA harmless procedural error approach to essentially nullify the 
effect of the state’s more rigorous standard for FBA access.170 
                                                                                                             
rated a two-part test for FAPE: (1) compliance with the procedures set forth in the IDEA, and, on the 
substantive side, (2) an individualized program reasonably calculated to enable the child with dis-
abilities to receive educational benefits. Id. at 207–08. Although widely used in subsequent court 
decisions, the Court crafted this test specifically for the child in this case in relation to the LRE, or 
“mainstreaming,” mandate for education with nondisabled children to the maximum extent appropri-
ate. Id. at 203–04. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed LRE in terms of a 
corresponding test, several appellate courts have developed multipart frameworks that typically 
include a behavioral factor. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The “Inclusion” Case Law: A Factor Analysis, 
127 EDUC. L. REP. 533 (1998). When the FBA or BIP issues arise in LRE cases, if at all, it is in 
connection with this behavioral factor. 
 164. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. In the FAPE context, the focus was on 
whether the behavior impeded the child’s own learning whereas in the LRE context, the focus tended 
to extend to the effect on other children’s learning. 
 165. Zirkel, supra note 50 and accompanying text. In addition to California and New York, 
which have stronger and more extensive provisions for FBAs and BIPs, Minnesota and Pennsylvania 
were particularly notable in terms of their stronger standard for access to FBAs and BIPs, respective-
ly. However, inasmuch as the cases extend back to 1998, there have been at least limited changes in 
state laws and the IDEA during the period of this study. See, e.g., Lincoln Intermediate Unit No. 12, 
34 IDELR ¶ 305 (Pa. SEA 2001); Kennett Consol. Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR ¶ 54 (Pa. SEA 1999); Jim 
Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 320 (Pa. SEA 1998); Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 24 IDELR 493 (Pa. 
SEA 1998). 
 166. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 167. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) (2008). 
 168. See, e.g., Lessard v. Wilton-Lindeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 1827 (1st Cir. 
2008); J.A. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 603 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); J.K. v. Metro. Sch. 
Dist. Sw. Allen Cnty., 44 IDELR ¶ 122 (N.D. Ind. 2005); Robert B. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 
44 IDELR ¶ 123 (E.D. Pa. 2005); cf. Lake Travis Indep. Sch. Dist. v. M.L., 50 IDELR ¶ 105 (W.D. 
Tex. 2007) (addressing the issue jurisdictionally and only in terms of considering behavioral inter-
ventions). 
 169. A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 170. M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 54 IDELR ¶ 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); M.N. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Educ., 54 IDELR ¶ 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Connor v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 53 IDELR ¶ 192 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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For the “appropriateness” issues, following the overriding two-
dimensional view of FAPE,171 both the hearing officers and the courts 
tended to view the FBA or BIP issues as procedural, but they ultimately 
relied on the substantive standard of reasonable benefit.172 Absent defini-
tions for FBAs and BIPs in the IDEA,173 and absent specific standards 
for FBAs and BIPs in most state laws,174 the basis for the hearing/review 
officer’s or court’s rulings, to the extent specified in the decisions, were 
most often evidentiary. Expert witnesses, including qualified school per-
sonnel, played a notable role in terms of providing and applying criteria. 
In some cases, the adjudicator cited Rowley;175 in other cases, Rowley 
was implicit within the general harmless error procedural approach; 176 
and in still other cases, the standard was not at all clear, with the decision 
only offering a cryptic conclusion incidental to other larger issues.177 
Most interesting of all, the following sequence of cases provides a 
chronological, flipbook-style illustration for the foregoing forum com-
parison:178 (1) the development by an Iowa hearing officer of a four-
criteria test for BIP appropriateness that was composed of professional 
standards incorporated in a variety of previous hearing/review officer 
decisions;179 (2) the application of this test in subsequent hearing officer 
decisions in two jurisdictions;180 (3) the rejection of this test by the Se-
                                                 
 171. See supra note 163. Hearing/review officers and courts in these cases tended to use the 
Rowley two-part characterization regardless of whether expressly treating the FBA or BIP issues as 
FAPE. 
 172. Prior to and during the period of this study, the courts developed and consistently used a 
harmless error approach when analyzing procedural violations of the IDEA. Under the harmless 
error approach, a procedural violation is not a per se denial of FAPE. Congress eventually codified 
this approach in the 2004 amendments to the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E). This approach treats 
a procedural violation as a denial of FAPE only if it results in the program not being reasonably 
calculated to yield benefit. Id. 
 173. See supra Part III.B. 
 174. Zirkel, supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 175. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 30 IDELR 88 (Tex. SEA 1999). 
 176. See, e.g., Edwin K. v. Jackson, 33 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 177. See, e.g., A.H. v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., 55 IDELR ¶ 36 (2d Cir. 2010); Dumont 
Bd. of Educ. v. J.T., 54 IDELR ¶ 231 (D.N.J. 2010); New Haven Unified Sch., 44 IDELR ¶ 207 
(Cal. SEA 2005); Acad. Sch. Dist. #20, 37 IDELR ¶ 171 (Colo. SEA 2002); E. Cent. Kan. Special 
Educ. Coop., 31 IDELR ¶ 256 (Kan. SEA 1999). Greater Albany Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 56 (Or. 
SEA 2007); Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 25 (Pa. SEA 2008); Connally Indep. Sch. Dist., 
34 IDELR ¶ 309 (Tex. SEA 2001). 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 157–58. 
 179. Mason City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 50 (Iowa SEA 2001). The hearing officer was 
a nonattorney special education professor who authored a BIP study five years later. See Etscheidt, 
supra note 46. 
 180. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR ¶ 209 (Ill. SEA 2002); Lynn-Mar 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR ¶ 24 (Iowa SEA 2004) (rulings by different hearing officers); Mason 
City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 50 (Iowa SEA 2001) (ruling in a different case with the same 
hearing officer).  
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venth Circuit in Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Community School Dis-
trict;181 (4) the limited moderation of the Alex R. rejection in a recent un-
published Iowa federal court decision, which affirmed the same Iowa 
hearing officer’s most recent pertinent decision;182 (5) the reaffirmation 
of Alex R. in other jurisdictions’ judicial rulings in a more district-
deferential manner;183 and (6) the elimination of Iowa’s part-time, largely 
special-education-trained hearing officers and replacement with full-time 
governmental administrative law judges (ALJs).184 
                                                 
 181. The opinion stated: 
[N]either Congress nor the agency charged with devising the implementing regulations 
for the IDEA, the Department of Education, had created any specific substantive re-
quirements for the [BIP] contemplated by § 1415(k)(1) or § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i). Alex does 
not point us to any statute or regulation that has since filled the gap, and our research has 
uncovered none. Alex, nevertheless, urges us to follow the lead of the administrative 
judge in Mason City, who manufactured the substantive criteria of a sufficient behavioral 
intervention plan based on a string of administrative opinions. We decline the invitation. 
Although we may interpret a statute and its implementing regulations, we may not create 
out of whole cloth substantive provisions for the behavioral intervention plan contem-
plated by [the IDEA]. In short, the District’s [BIP] could not have fallen short of substan-
tive criteria that do not exist, and so we conclude as a matter of law that it was not subs-
tantively invalid under the IDEA. 
Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 182. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Isabel L., 51 IDELR ¶ 15 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (interpreting Alex 
R. and related decisions as rejecting substantive standards but allowing consideration of these factors 
within the overall and overriding determination of FAPE). For another, more confusing limitation of 
Alex R., see Lewis Central School District, 42 IDELR ¶ 247 (Iowa 2005). 
 183. See, e.g., Lessard v. Wilton-Lindeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2008); 
T.W. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 136 F. App’x 122 (10th Cir. 2005); Lake Travis Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. M.L., 50 IDELR ¶ 105 (W.D. Tex. 2005); J.K. v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Sw. Allen Cnty., 44 
IDELR ¶ 122 (N.D. Ind. 2005). Although the language excerpted from the court’s decision in Wau-
kee Community School District, see supra note 182, could be interpreted as supporting the behavior-
impeding standard for a BIP, the First Circuit was more representative of the prevailing judicial 
interpretation: 
An even more egregious misunderstanding of the IDEA’s requirements undermines the 
claim of procedural error based on a missing behavioral plan. The IDEA only requires a 
behavioral plan when certain disciplinary actions are taken against a disabled child. The 
appellants make no claim that the necessary disciplinary predicate had transpired in this 
instance. The other statutory provision cited by the appellants—20 U.S.C. 
§ 1414(d)(3)(B)(i)—also falls short of requiring a behavioral plan as an ubiquitous fea-
ture in every IEP. That statute, in terms, directs IEP teams to “consider, when appropri-
ate,” formulating such plans. 
Lessard v. Wilton-Lindeborough Coop Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d at 26–27 (citing 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(k)(1)(A) & (B); Alex. R., 375 F.3d at 614); see also J.K. v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Sw. Allen Cnty., 
44 IDELR ¶ 122 (N.D. Ind. 2005). 
 184. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Iowa Department of Education and the Iowa 
Department of Inspections and Appeals (June 7, 2010) (on file with author). In Iowa, the ALJs work 
in the Administrative Hearings Division of the Department of Inspections and Appeals. See Adminis-
trative Hearings Division, IOWA DEP’T OF INSPECTIONS & APPEALS, http://dia.iowa.gov/page10. 
html (last visited July 6, 2010). 
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For the relatively few “implementation” issue rulings, the bases of 
the rulings were consistently evidentiary, and the approach tended to use 
substantial or ad hoc equitable, rather than 100%, compliance as the 
standard.185 Although not typically cited in these rulings, court decisions 
in general FAPE cases have similarly adopted a less than strict standard 
for IEP implementation.186 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The major findings in this study were that (1) the frequency of FBA 
and BIP cases increased modestly since the 1997 IDEA amendments; (2) 
the outcomes during this period shifted after approximately 2004 from a 
parent-favorable to a district-favorable overall balance; (3) the most fre-
quent category and subcategory of the issue rulings were BIPs and their 
appropriateness, respectively; (4) the outcomes within each of the cate-
gories and subcategories were relatively balanced between parents and 
districts, with the exception of BIP implementation, which was relatively 
infrequent but heavily skewed in favor of districts; and (5) the outcomes 
were not significantly different between the FBA and BIP categories, but 
they were significantly more favorable for districts in the judicial forum 
than in the hearing/review officer forum for both FBAs and BIPs. 
A. Forum Difference 
The most statistically and pervasively significant of these findings 
compared the outcomes per forum187 and merits discussion prior to the 
other findings.  FBAs and BIPs are so interrelated, both in terms of pro-
fessional practice and legal treatment, that the adjudicatory outcomes 
would be expected to be similar. But the significantly higher number of 
district-favorable rulings at the judicial level compared to the hear-
ing/review officer level is expected and helps explain and interpret the 
other findings of this study. 
This statistically significant forum-based difference is expected be-
cause of three key institutional differences. First, although in recent years 
there has been a gradual move toward using judges in hearing/review 
                                                 
 185. See, e.g., L. v. North Haven Bd. of Educ., 52 IDELR ¶ 254 (D. Conn. 2009); Bd. of Educ. 
v. Michael R., 44 IDELR ¶ 36 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 486 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Wilkes-Barre Area Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR ¶ 17 (Pa. SEA 1999). 
 186. See, e.g., Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan, 642 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2011); Van 
Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007); Melissa S. v. Sch. Dist., 183 F. App’x 
184 (3d Cir. 2006); Catalan v. District of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2007); Clear Creek 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. J.K., 400 F. Supp. 2d 991 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 187. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text. 
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officer proceedings under the IDEA,188 the hearing officers in the majori-
ty (n=33) of the states are part-time personnel with full-time roles—for 
example, private attorneys—rather than professional ALJs.189 Despite the 
formal, special education background of both groups being relatively 
limited, 190  the predominant group obviously has a less strict judicial 
posture. Second, the informal nature of these administrative adjudica-
tions contributes to a less strict adjudicative perspective. Finally, because 
the hearing officer stage is the principal and often sole source of fact 
finding,191 expert testimony plays a much more direct role. Thus, it was 
not surprising that a statistically significant difference between the two 
forums was found. Equally unsurprising was the qualitative difference 
revealing that hearing/review officers, compared to courts, tended to be 
less strict in legal interpretation and relied more on expert testimony that 
reflected professional norms.192 
Perhaps the best illustration of this significant forum-based finding 
is the difference between, and the progression from, the Iowa hearing 
officer’s best practice decision and the Seventh Circuit’s Alex R. rul-
ing.193 Similarly, given the hierarchal structure of the stare decisis doc-
trine and the comparative impact of the judicial decisions, the Second 
Circuit’s A.C. decision further illustrates the cumulative tendency to shift 
the outcomes in the defendant–school districts’ favor194 unless the IDEA 
or state laws are amended to combat that tendency. 
B. Longitudinal Frequency 
This significant forum-based difference contributes to the explana-
tion of the first finding of the study, which was the relatively modest in-
crease in the number of FBA and BIP cases since the 1997 amendments 
of the IDEA.195 This increase was in the same direction, but to a lesser 
degree, as the longitudinal trend in special education case law general-
                                                 
 188. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel et al., Creeping Judicialization of Special Education Hearings: 
An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007). 
 189. Zirkel & Scala, supra note 12, at 5. The number of two-tier states (i.e., those with a re-
view officer level) has dwindled to ten, with all but New York being at the part-time level. Id. 
 190. Id. at 6. 
 191. The IDEA authorizes courts to hear additional evidence, but the clear majority of courts 
decide their review of hearing/review officer decisions on summary judgment. See, e.g., Andriy 
Krahmal, Perry A. Zirkel & Emily Kirk, “Additional Evidence” Under the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act: The Need for Rigor, 9 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 201 (2004). 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 165–68 and 173–74. 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 179–84. 
 194. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra Figure 1. 
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ly.196 A differentially higher trajectory might have been expected in light 
of this first-time recognition in the IDEA of FBAs and BIPs, as well as 
the increasing emphasis of this linked pair of behavioral strategies in the 
special education literature leading to and following this recognition.197 
Not surprisingly, most of the FBA and BIP issue rulings arose as a rela-
tively small part of a larger FAPE or LRE case rather than in disciplinary 
change-of-placement cases 198  where IDEA recognition is clearest but 
litigation is infrequent.199 But the less obvious and perhaps more power-
ful contributing factor was the effect of judicial precedents that were sys-
tematically more favorable to districts than the underlying hear-
ing/review officer decisions. 
The cumulative and immediately predictable effect is stronger in 
light of the finding of a marked increase in the proportion of case law at 
the judicial, rather than hearing/review officer, level during the thirteen-
year period of this study.200 This dramatic increase may be attributable to 
the time lag in moving from decisions at the administrative level to the 
final decision upon judicial review.201 Another possible explanation con-
tributing to this shift, which is purely speculative in the absence of avail-
able empirical evidence, is a change in the percentage of FBA and BIP 
cases subject to judicial review or selected for IDELR publication. 
Whatever the reason, the effect is contrary to the proactive direction of 
special education norms but with two possible exceptions. First, as the 
                                                 
 196. Zirkel & D’Angelo, supra note 44, at 740 (finding uneven growth of IDELR-published 
hearing/review officer decisions in three-year periods from 1977–1979 to 1998–2000); Perry A. 
Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The “Explosion” in Education Litigation: An Updated Analysis, 265 
EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011) (finding pronounced increase in special education court decisions in Wes-
tlaw database within ten-year periods, especially in the most recent decade). The overlap with, rather 
than identity of, time periods and adjudicatory forum precludes definitive comparisons. 
 197. But the limited scope of this recognition, as largely confirmed in the subsequent regula-
tions, the 2004 amendments, and the relatively few state laws providing much stronger recognition, 
may have had a dampening effect. See Zirkel, supra note 50 and accompanying text. Another possi-
ble moderating factor is the relatively limited role of FBAs and BIPs in special education disputes 
compared to such high-stakes issues as tuition reimbursement. See, e.g., Thomas Mayes & Perry A. 
Zirkel, Special Education Tuition Reimbursement Claims: An Empirical Analysis, 22 REMEDIAL & 
SPECIAL EDUC. 350 (2001) (finding marked increase in such litigation in initial period after statutory 
codification in IDEA 1997). 
 198. See supra text accompanying notes 162–63. 
 199. For example, in the ten successive updates of published court decisions under the IDEA, 
FAPE has by far been the largest segment of the litigation while discipline has been one of the smal-
lest segments. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Tessie Rose, Special Education Law Update X, 240 
EDUC. L. REP. 503 (2009). 
 200. See supra Figure 1. Specifically, the percentages in the white bars represent the proportion 
of FBA and BIP rulings attributable to the courts instead of hearing/review officers. 
 201. For example, in a recent study of autism litigation, the average time between the hearing 
officer decision and the final decision after judicial review was approximately 2.8 years. Perry A. 
Zirkel, Autism Litigation under the IDEA: A New Meaning of “Disproportionality”?, J. SPECIAL 
EDUC. LEADERSHIP (forthcoming 2011). 
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1997 IDEA originally illustrated, legislation and regulations may be 
amended to incorporate professional norms. Second, school districts may 
opt to engage in proactive best practice as professionally appropriate or 
as litigation avoidance.202 
C. Longitudinal Outcomes 
This forum-based difference, in combination with the increasing 
proportion of court rulings, appears to be the principal reason for the 
shift during this period from a parent-favorable to a district-favorable 
overall balance. In contrast, although the approximate balancing point in 
the outcome ratio was 2004,203 the IDEA amendments of that year would 
not appear to be a major independent contributing factor because (1) 
their effective date was not until mid-2005, and the courts have predomi-
nantly rejected their retroactive application;204 and (2) the IDEA’s dis-
pute resolution process is rather “ponderous.”205 It may be, however, that 
the narrowness of these amendments had a confirming effect on adjudi-
cators.206 In any event, caution is warranted because the unit of analysis 
for outcomes was the issue, not the case.207 
D. Categorical Frequency and Outcomes 
The predominance of BIP rulings,208 particularly those concerning 
appropriateness, is not surprising in light of (1) the more concrete and 
culminating nature of BIPs in the FBA–BIP process; (2) the lack of BIP 
criteria in the IDEA;209 and (3) the overriding FAPE analysis in many 
                                                 
 202. The alternative hypothesis—that the case law is only representative of infrequent excep-
tions to best practice—is much less likely because (1) there would be little reason for the continuous 
flow of special education legislation and regulations and the increase in litigation if prevailing prac-
tice was at this optimum level; and (2) the outcomes would be much less district favorable overall 
and longitudinally. 
 203. See supra Figure 2. 
 204. See, e.g., Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 2010); Bell v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 52 IDELR ¶ 161 (D.N.M. 2008); Anthony v. District of Columbia, 
463 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 205. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985). Although the 
time lag is particularly pronounced for judicial review, e.g., supra note 201, the hearing/review 
officer stage often exceeds the regulatory timeline. See, e.g., Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. No. 414 v. Of-
fice of the State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 634 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2011); Dep’t of Educ., 
State of Haw. v. T.G., 56 IDELR ¶ 97 (D. Haw. 2010); O.O. v. District of Columbia, 573 F. Supp. 
2d 41 (D.D.C. 2008); E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 39 (N.D. Cal. 2007); 
Doe v. E. Greenwich Sch. Dep’t, 899 A.2d 1258 (R.I. 2006). 
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 70, 73–75. 
 207. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra Figure 3. 
 209. In most jurisdictions, state law has not played a major role in this respect. See Zirkel, 
supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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cases.210 But the fluid boundaries between and within the FBA and BIP 
issue categorization cautions against overreliance on these counts.211 
The outcomes analysis in Figure 4 revealed that parents fared as 
well as or slightly better than districts for each subcategory, except for 
the relatively infrequent subcategory of BIP implementation. These out-
comes are based on issue rulings that averaged approximately 1.2 per 
case212 and which were sometimes only an incidental part of much larger 
issues.213 Indeed, in an occasional case, the outcome of a marginal FBA 
or BIP issue was different from the outcome of the central issue.214 Al-
though not identical with respect to the unit of analysis, time period, or 
outcomes scale, the balance was at least modestly more parent-favorable 
for the FBA and BIP rulings—with the limited exception of BIP imple-
mentation—than the previous research.215 The difference may be due to 
the lack of specific standards and ad hoc reliance on professional opinion 
via expert witnesses, especially in the hearing/review officer decisions.216  
In contrast, the relatively few implementation cases were largely matter 
of facts instead of opinion when the standard was rather concrete217 and 
when the school officials had the obvious “home field” advantage in 
terms of the evidence and the burden of proof. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although both the IDEA (in its next reauthorization) and state laws 
are a macro or policymaking solution, both in terms of providing more 
stringent standards for access to and appropriateness of FBAs and BIPs, 
this model is unlikely to be used to its fullest extent in light of the current 
political climate. The height of the professional push for, as well as poli-
cymaking receptivity to, such proactive approaches to improving beha-
vior was in the 1997 IDEA amendments. Since then, the focus has been 
on academic improvement as illustrated by the No Child Left Behind 
                                                 
 210. See supra text accompanying notes 163, 171. 
 211. Approximately one-fifth of the cases presented issue identification at the margin between 
categories or subcategories thus leading to tentative counts. See supra note 137. 
 212. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 163–64. 
 214. See, e.g., E. Cent. Kan. Special Educ. Coop., 31 IDELR ¶ 256 (Kan. SEA 1999) (ruling 
not only in favor of the parent for the BIP issue but also in favor of the district for the larger primary 
issue of LRE). 
 215. See, e.g., Zirkel & D’Angelo, supra 44, at 744–47 (previous studies and hearing/review 
officer and court decisions from 1989 to 2000). All of these other studies used the case rather than 
the issue category or subcategory as the unit of analysis. Moreover, the majority were limited to 
court decisions. 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 165, 173–74. 
 217. See supra text accompanying note 186. 
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Act218 and on cutbacks in governmental resources for public education, 
including the emphasis on proactive reforms and interventions.219 
A more feasible and potentially favorable solution,220 especially in 
light of the individualized nature of the IDEA and evolving science and 
art of special education, is a more coherent case-by-case application of 
the available standards. Specifically, what is roughly referred to here as 
“access,” representing when a child is entitled to an FBA or a BIP under 
the IDEA, could be reasonably decided—in terms of being more predict-
able and parsimonious221—via the well-established IDEA concept of, and 
standard for, “related services.”222 First, this IDEA concept has a broad 
definition that is sufficiently ample and flexible to cover FBAs and BIPs.  
More specifically, the IDEA regulations define “related services” in rele-
vant part as “developmental, corrective, and other supportive services as 
are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special edu-
cation.”223 The long and nonexhaustive list of examples includes “psy-
chological services,” which in turn are defined by the IDEA regulations 
to include administering assessment procedures and interpreting assess-
ment results; “[o]btaining, integrating, and interpreting information about 
child behavior”; and “[a]ssisting in developing positive behavioral inter-
                                                 
 218. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the effects of this Act, see, e.g., 
Sandy Kress et al., When Performance Matters: The Past, Present, and Future of Consequential 
Accountability in Public Education, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 185 (2011); James E. Ryan, The Per-
verse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2004). For highlights of 
the Act’s interactions with the IDEA, see Perry A. Zirkel, What Does It Mean for Students with 
Disabilities, 185 EDUC. L. REP. 804 (2004). 
 219. For samples of the widespread recognition of the effects of the economy on public educa-
tion, see John Dayton et al., Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?: Contemplating the Future of School 
Funding Litigation in Tough Economic Times, 258 EDUC. L. REP. 937 (2010); Monica Teixeira de 
Sousa, A Race to the Bottom?: President Obama’s Incomplete and Conservative Strategy for Re-
forming Education in Struggling Schools or the Perils of Ignoring Poverty, 39 STETSON L. REV. 629 
(2010). 
 220. More careful experimentation in the form of enacting specific and stringent state special-
education laws, with accompanying careful research and scholarship, is warranted before adding to 
the many mandates of the IDEA. See, e.g., Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 239, 269 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(“Hard decisions of resource allocation, like the determinations of educational policy are best left to 
the states, in the first instance.”). 
 221. Cost is a recognized, though not primary or uniform, factor in adjudicating special educa-
tion cases. See, e.g., Leslie A. Collins & Perry A. Zirkel, To What Extent, If Any, May Cost Be a 
Factor in Special Education Cases?, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 11 (1992). This federal requirement serves as 
a minimum foundation upon which both state law and local education agency choice may add. 
 222. 20 U.S.C. § 1402 (2009). 
 223. Id. § 1401. Showing the wide boundaries of this term, the list includes, for example, 
orientation and mobility services; recreation, including therapeutic recreation; school health services; 
and parent counseling and training. Id. 
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vention strategies.”224 Second, the “required . . . [for] benefit from special 
education” element of the definition225 provides a necessity standard that 
has proven to be a reasonable test226 for determining whether an individ-
ual child with a disability is entitled to a particular related service.227 This 
necessity standard, which is keyed to the child’s special education 
progress, is clearly an improvement over the current ad hoc, absent, or 
incorrect standard practice among both hearing/review officers and 
courts in the many states that do not specify the behavior-impeding 
test.228 On the other hand, the Second Circuit’s approach of treating an 
express behavior-impeding standard of access as merely procedural229 
and thus subject to the IDEA’s harmless-error approach for FAPE230 
would appear to run counter to the IDEA’s state-adding building block of 
“cooperative federalism.”231 An access standard for an FBA or a BIP is 
as much or more substantive as it is procedural, which is more directly a 
matter of eligibility than FAPE. 
In contrast, for “appropriateness,” the predominant but not univer-
sal approach232 of applying the Rowley standard of reasonably calculated 
for educational benefit233 uses an available and time-tested standard that 
is preferable to an ad hoc approach, which would be either lacking a spe-
cific standard or based on professional norms not adopted by legislation 
                                                 
 224. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(10) (2009). Other separately defined illustrations include “counsel-
ing services,” “rehabilitation counseling,” and “social work services.” Id. §§ 300.23(c)(14), 
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 225. See supra text accompanying note 223. 
 226. See 20 U.S.C. § 1402. 
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supra notes 164–68 and accompanying text. 
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 233. See supra note 163. 
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or regulations. It is also preferable in the stead of the other extreme: the 
Alex R. eviscerating approach, which leaves an FBA or a BIP as a poten-
tially empty exercise unless the IDEA is amended or state laws fill the 
gap.234 
Finally, the present approach for evaluating an implementation 
challenge to a BIP seems to be a fitting application of the more general 
approach for such IEP and FAPE cases, which uses a standard of reason-
able or equitable compliance rather than 100% compliance.235 Thus, ab-
sent an amendment to the IDEA, a more rigorous optimal standard is ap-
propriately left to state law or local policy.236 
In sum, this quantitative and qualitative analysis of the FBA and 
BIP case law reveals the need for a more consistent and coherent ap-
proach to the access, appropriateness, and implementation issues of these 
interrelated behavioral features of special education under the IDEA and 
related state laws. Although the application must be adjudicated on an 
individualized basis, the standards must be clearer and more consistent 
based on the available and pertinent concepts of the IDEA. State laws 
that incorporate higher standards similarly require more defensible adju-
dication with the separate desiderata of professional norms left to local 
discretion to the extent that the next IDEA reauthorization and future 
state laws do not expressly adopt them. 
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